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Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2006

contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753121

Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing

Müller, Markus - 2009

We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753178

Tax Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2009

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753187

Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication

Gersbach, Hans - 2011

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753207

Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics

Gersbach, Hans; Ponta, Oriana - 2012

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753222

Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T.; Tejada, Oriol - 2014

We examine the effects of a novel political institution, which we call Coalition- Preclusion Contracts, on elections …, policies, and welfare. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts enable political parties to credibly commit before the elections not to … form a coalition after the elections with one or several other parties specified in the contract. We consider a political …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753259

Costs of Change, Political Polarization, and Re-election Hurdles

Gersbach, Hans; Muller, Philippe; Tejada, Oriol - 2015

We develop and study a two-period model of political competition with office- and policymotivated candidates, in which (i) changes of policies impose costs on all individuals and (ii) such costs increase with the magnitude of the policy change. We show that there is an optimal positive level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753286

A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies

Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol - 2016

We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753319

Policy reforms and the amount of checks & balances

Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol; Wagner, Julia - 2022

We examine how democracies choose their amount of checks and balances (C&B). For this purpose, we consider a simple model of political competition with costly policy reforms. The cost of a marginal reform is determined endogenously at the constitutional phase-i.e. before policies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013346919