We study a model in which an inventor discloses knowledge about its innovation and then a rival chooses the probability of attaining a competing invention. Disclosures, by creating prior art, diminish the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent for its invention (legal externality),...

We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, two-player common-value Tullock contests in which one of the players has an information advantage have a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium both players exert...

Using a large and rich data set from administrative sources, we study the effects of children on mothers’ employment and earnings in Spain. By being able to pinpoint the event of multiple births along a twenty-year panel of women’s work history, we address two methodological hurdles in this...

This paper provides a farm sector comparison of relative levels of capital input for seventeen OECD countries for the period 1973-2011. The starting point for construction of a measure of capital input is the measurement of capital stock. Estimates of depreciable capital are derived by...

This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the production cost which is the private information of the agents and is correlated between them. We find that the agency relationship...

This paper introduce a list of desirable efficiency properties that any a patent system should have in order to enhance innovation, trade competitiveness, employment mobility and economic growth. We briefly overview the literature on patents and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the...

Using a club theory approach, this paper provides an equilibrium model in which traders must belong to at least one bourse in order to trade assets. We show, by means of examples, that: 1) traders’ complementarities in preferences and endowments can determine the formation of both large...

Consider any investor who fears ruin facing any set of investments that satisfy noarbitrage. Before investing, he can purchase information about the state of nature in the form of an information structure. Given his prior, information structure α is more informative than information structure...

Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies...

We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the...