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conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062663
a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556538
It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder behavior differs substantially according...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005119388
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163083
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected … in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163101
one seller, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the … first period. The outcome with n sellers depends both on the structure of sellers' information and, more importantly, on the … intensity of competition among them allowed by the trading rules. With intense competition (absence of clienteles), information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163102
parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the … the private information is truthfully elicited and the social optimum ends up being implemented? In designing such a … mechanism, appropriate incentives will have to be given to the agents so that they do not wish to misrepresent their information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005697960