We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …

decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …

potential for product market collusion. For that we utilize a dynamic model of R&D whereby we consider all possible initial … extension of the cooperative agreement towards collusion in the product market is not necessarily welfare reducing: if firms …

the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for …. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus. …

increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as … initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion …

increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as … initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion …