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Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255908
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Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752907
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Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255466
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Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity And The Effectiveness Of Leniency Programs in Experimental Auctions
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two commonly used auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531423
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Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838652
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Screening for Collusion: A Spatial Statistics Approach
Heijnen, Pim; Haan, Marco A.; Soetevent, Adriaan R. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
We develop a method to screen for local cartels. We first test whether there is statistical evidence of clustering of outlets that score high on some characteristic that is consistent with collusive behavior. If so, we determine in a second step the most suspicious regions where further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255447
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In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal … collusion could thus yield higher total surplus. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256291
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Going Once, Going Twice, Reported!
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257084
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Clustered bids in first-price auctions : collusion or competition?
Leverano, Adriano de - In: Economics letters 233 (2023), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014506238
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Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
Hu, Luke - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722