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Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186

Decentralized bargaining in matching markets : efficient stationary equilibria and the core

Elliott, Matthew L.; Nava, Francesco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 211-251

This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020318

On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás - In: Economics letters 167 (2018), pp. 99-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015800

On the consistency of data with bargaining theories

Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 137-162

We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684957

Bargaining set with endogenous leaders : a convergence result

Hervés-Estévez, Javier; Moreno-García, Emma - In: Economics letters 166 (2018), pp. 10-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011375

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720

Ashamed to be selfish

Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 99-124

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690900

Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276