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Efficiency of financial transmission rights markets in centrally coordinated periodic auctions

Adamson, Seabron; Noe, Thomas H.; Parker, Geoffrey - In: Energy economics 32 (2010) 4, pp. 771-778

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008779957

Dilution costs, underinvestment, and utility regulation under asymmetric information

Kale, Jayant R. - In: Journal of regulatory economics 7 (1995) 2, pp. 177-197

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001178065

Takeovers of diffusely held firms : a nonstandard approach

Noe, Thomas H. - In: Mathematical finance : an international journal of … 5 (1995) 3, pp. 247-277

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001188682

Efficiency of financial transmission rights markets in centrally coordinated periodic auctions

Adamson, Seabron; Noe, Thomas; Parker, Geoffrey - In: Energy economics 32 (2010) 4, pp. 771-779

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008422682

Efficiency of financial transmission rights markets in centrally coordinated periodic auctions

Adamson, Seabron; Noe, Thomas; Parker, Geoffrey - In: Energy Economics 32 (2010) 4, pp. 771-778

Electricity market design in the United States is increasingly dominated by locational marginal pricing (LMP) of energy and transmission. LMP markets are typically coupled with periodic auctions of financial transmission rights (FTRs) to hedge transmission price risks. While LMP designs offer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494708