Many firms voluntarily incur the costs of attempting to influence politicians. However, estimates of the value of political connections have been made in only a few extreme cases. We propose a new approach to valuing political ties that builds on these previous studies. We consider connected to...

We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD countries. Results indicate that governments typically transfer ownership rights without relinquishing proportional control. Control is commonly retained by leveraging state investments through pyramids, dual-class shares, and...

Using a newly assembled 50 country firm-level database spanning 19 years, we document a “bright side” for employees of business group affiliated firms: less pronounced fluctuations in employment than unaffiliated firms in response to macroeconomic shocks. The results are robust to a variety...

We study how political factors can shape competition in the mobile telecommunication sector. We show that the way a government designs the rules of the game has an impact on concentration, competition, and prices. Pro-competition rules reduce prices, but do not hurt the quality of services or...

Family-controlled pyramidal business groups were important in Canada early in the 20th century, amid rapid catch-up industrialization, but largely gave way to widely held freestanding firms by mid-century. In the 1970s and early 1980s – an era of high inflation, financial reversal,...

Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...

Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with independent directors' power, gauged by social network power centrality. Powerful independent directors' sudden deaths reduce shareholder value significantly; other independent directors' deaths do not. More...