We analyze whether institutional investors’ corporate bond holdings are associated with how actively they vote and monitor their equity investments. We document that institutions conduct more governance research and are less likely to follow proxy advisor vote recommendations for companies...

A common argument against divestment is that it jettisons voting power and that it has a small effect on stock prices. We argue that divestment is a form of voice that changes social preferences. We show that the Go Fossil Free divestment movement has had a disproportionate impact on share...

We study the potential negative externalities of mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Our analysis exploits a unique regulatory change in China that requires a subset of firms to report their contributions to poverty alleviation—on top of reporting general ESG...

In the 1980s, stock exchanges and eventually the SEC took actions that affected the eligibility of listed firms to adopt dual-class shares with differential voting rights. We find that risk-adjusted stock returns increase (decrease) in reaction to regulatory events that decrease (increase) the...

We document that regulatory enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation cluster in industry-specific waves and that wave-related enforcement has information spillovers on industry peer firms. Waves and spillovers have significant effects on share prices. Early-wave target firms have the...

Antitakeover provisions play a central role in corporate governance research. But there is little agreement over which, if any, provisions affect takeover likelihoods. As a result, researchers variously use the G-index, E-index, ad hoc indices, or selected individual provisions such as...

The quality of proxy advisors' voting recommendations is important for policymakers and industry participants. We analyze the design of recommendations (available to all market participants) and research reports (available only to subscribers) by a proxy advisor, whose objective is to maximize...

This paper estimates mutual funds’ preferences for governance structures, using data on proxy vote records. I elicit funds’ revealed preferences by studying the differences in their votes on the same issue across their portfolio firms’ shareholder proposals, and develop funds’ preference...

This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. It explains how and why a voting premium emerges in the absence of takeovers and controlling shareholders. The model features a minority blockholder and dispersed shareholders who trade shares in a competitive...

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite...