We analyze class action litigation as a corporate governance device. Firms that have lower internal governance standards and those with fewer external monitors are more likely to be indicted. Lawsuits announcements are salient information to the market, as firms, on average, lose 12.3% without a...

Are firms' financial disclosure decisions affected by executive compensation at other firms? We find that a CEO's pay gap relative to the highest CEO pay among industry peers, defined as industry tournament incentives, can lead to distortions in corporate financial disclosures. Our analyses show...

We find that ownership changes much less over time in private firms than in public firms. The average largest shareholder in private (public) Norwegian firms keeps the same stake in 82% (14%) of two consecutive years. In private firms past ownership dominates ownership determinants proposed in...

This article reviews research conducted from 2011-2020 on the corporate governance of Korean firms. The purpose is to promote academic interest in Korean corporate governance research especially among non-Korean scholars and to provide guidance to young Korean scholars who are working in this...

Classified boards are not an endangered species. They are hiding in plain sight among the near 80% of public firms not covered in commercial databases, typically those in the S&P 1500 Index. We utilize machine learning algorithms to determine the classified board status for all U.S. public firms...

We create a new measure called director-specific quality (DSQ) that captures the collection of value-relevant transferable attributes unique to a director and explains 10% of the variation in firm value. Directors with higher DSQ receive greater voter support, and investors respond more (less)...

This study examines the effect of outside director tenure length on firms’ market valuation and the voting behavior of outside directors. We make use of the new rule adopted by the Korean government in 2020 that prohibits outside directors from serving more than six (nine) years in a given...

We analyze whether institutional investors’ corporate bond holdings are associated with how actively they vote and monitor their equity investments. We document that institutions conduct more governance research and are less likely to follow proxy advisor vote recommendations for companies...

We show that the main claim in Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (JF forthcoming) (DGS), namely "that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components,"...

This study examines whether labor plays a role in corporate governance by deterring opportunistic insider behavior. Results suggest that firms with organized labor experience statistically significant declines in opportunistic insider trading activity and profitability. We show three economic...