Showing 1 - 7 of 7
This paper contributes to consistency for the additive efficient normalization of semivalues. Motivated from the additive efficient normalization of a semivalue being a B-revision of the Shapley value, we introduce the B-reduced game which is an extension of Sobolev’s reduced game. Then the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588349
The Reverse Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems applies the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA rule) for ‘large’ amounts of the estate, while it applies the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL rule) for ‘small’ amounts of the estate. The CEA rule, respectively CEL rule, can be axiomatized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662531
A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a situation in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. In this paper we consider non-negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865140
We study the existence problem of a zero point of a function defined on a finite set of elements of the integer lattice of the n-dimensional Euclidean space . It is assumed that the set is integrally convex, which implies that the convex hull of the set can be subdivided in simplices such that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009249549
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure of Aumann and Drèze (1974). They assumed that the player set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052647
Generalized characteristic functions extend characteristic functions of ‘classical’ TU-games by assigning a real number to every ordered coalition being a permutation of any subset of the player set. Such generalized characteristic functions can be applied when the earnings or costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052805
A ranking method assigns to every weighted directed graph a (weak) ordering of the nodes. In this paper we axiomatize the ranking method that ranks the nodes according to their outflow using four independent axioms. Besides the well-known axioms of anonymity and positive responsiveness we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005283815