Agents are connected each other through a tree. Each link of the tree has an associated cost and the total cost of the tree must be divided among the agents. In this paper we assume that agents are asymmetric (think on countries that use aqueducts to bring water from the rainy regions to the dry...

In this paper we study situations where a group of agents require a service that can only be provided from a source, the so-called source connection problems. These problems contain the standard fixed tree, the classical minimum spanning tree and some other related problems such as the k-hop,...

In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove...

Tijs et al. [23] introduce the family of obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. We give a generalization of such family. We prove that our family coincides with the set of rules satisfying an additivity property and a cost monotonicity property. We also provide two new...