Our research probes the firm valuation impact of partisan-motivated policy cycles. We first identify the micro-channels of policy transmission that link partisan policy disturbances to firm value. Then, we draw on firm-level data from 21 industrial democracies for the period extending from 1989...

The issue of central bank communication on fiscal policy has so far received very little attention in the literature. This article aims to shed light on the determinants of central bank communication on fiscal policy by analysing the intensity of central banks’ fiscal communication for five...

According to reputational models of Political Economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We use a dynamic panel data estimation strategy to test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977–2000, using...

We analyze the effect of budget consolidation on income inequality in 17 OECD countries while controlling for political and ideological differences. We find that the impact of fiscal adjustments on the Gini coefficient does not depend on the political party in power, but on the type of...

The role and influence of the finance minister within the cabinet are discussed with increasing prominence in the theoretical literature on the political economy of budget deficits. It is generally assumed that the spending ministers can enhance their reputation purely with new or more extensive...

This paper investigates whether the socioeconomic status of the head of government helps explain fiscal performance. Applying sociological research that attributes differences in people's ways of thinking and acting to their relative standing within society, we test whether the social status of...

This article uses unique voting data on 331 federal propositions to estimate voter preferences in Swiss cantons. We document that preferences vary systematically with cantonal characteristics. In particular, cantons whose voters are more conservative, less in favor of redistribution and less...

We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design...

This paper identifies the fiscal instruments that governments can use to promote economic growth when sociopolitical instability (SPI) is present. We show that fiscal policy that takes into account income distribution and SPI transforms a neoclassical growth model into one with both endogenous...

The recent financial crisis was characterized by the sizeable fiscal cost of banking sector bail out operations and the significant automatic and discretionary fiscal policy response to shrinking output, which have put increased pressure on public finances in many industrialized countries. This...