We test for the influence of absolute and relative deprivation — proxied by anthropometric methods — on civil war risk. A comprehensive height data set allows us to go back to 1816 for a global sample. We measure absolute deprivation using human stature and we use height inequality within...

Based on first-hand account, this paper offers evidence on price setting and price adjustment mechanisms that were illegally employed under the Soviet planning and rationing regime. The evidence is anecdotal, and is based on personal experience during the years 1960–1971 in the Republic of...

While the beneficial effects of social trust on economic performance have been largely recognized, we analyze whether these effects can be generalized for economies at different stages of economic development. Contrary to previous studies on this issue based on average effects (mostly...

This paper explores how social capital influences individual preferences for income redistribution. Social capital is measured by participation in community activities. After controlling for individual characteristics, I find that people are more likely to express preferences for income...

We analyze survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction law violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving and fare dodging – by disapproval or social exclusion. Our data show that people condition their willingness to sanction a norm violation on their belief about its...

We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the effects of group...

This article describes a large number of contestants with high and low levels of talent who individually decide to enter a contest or take their heterogeneous outside options. We derive a critical condition for which only high types, only low types or both types participate in the contest. If a...

This paper presents a theory of endogenous economic institutions in non-democracies, where political accountability is enforced through the threat of revolution. We consider a dynamic game between an elite ruling class and a disenfranchised working class, in which workers have imperfect...

Data on campaign contributions of PACs (political action committees) in the US does not contain the PACs' issues of concern. Additionally, while recent US lobbying data details the issues of concern for an interest group, it does not detail the Congressional representatives lobbied by the...