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Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion

Compte, Olivier; Jenny, Frédéric; Rey, Patrick - In: European economic review : EER 46 (2002) 1, pp. 1-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001635200

Strategic aspects of vertical delegation

Caillaud, Bernard - In: European economic review : EER 39 (1995) 3, pp. 421-431

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001181605

Corporate governance, competition policy and industrial policy

Aghion, Philippe - In: European economic review : EER 41 (1997) 3, pp. 797-805

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001224870

Competition between telecommunications operators

Laffont, Jean-Jacques - In: European economic review : EER 41 (1997) 3, pp. 701-711

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001224888

Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents

Guesnerie, Roger - In: European economic review : EER 33 (1989) 4, pp. 807-823

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001074678

On partial contracting

Aghion, Philippe; Dewatripont, Mathias; Rey, Patrick - In: European economic review : EER 46 (2002) 4/5, pp. 745-753

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001668763

On renegotiation design

Aghion, Philippe - In: European economic review : EER 34 (1990) 2, pp. 322-329

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001091049

Vertical integration as a source of hold-up : an experiment

Allain, Marie-Laure; Chambolle, Claire; Rey, Patrick; … - In: European economic review : EER 137 (2021), pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697565

Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination

Lopez, Angel Luis; Rey, Patrick - 2009

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046354