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Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: European economic review : EER 57 (2013) 1, pp. 108-117
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706219
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Bonus pools and the informativeness principle
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: European economic review : EER 66 (2014), pp. 180-191
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423081
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Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
Englmaier, Florian; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - In: European economic review : EER 67 (2014), pp. 82-106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423128
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Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams
Bose, Arup; Pal, Debashis; Sappington, David Edward Michael - In: European economic review : EER 54 (2010) 7, pp. 947-961
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008936665
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Monitoring versus incentives
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - In: European economic review : EER 45 (2001) 9, pp. 1741-1764
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001606617
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Retail contracting and costly monitoring : theory and evidence
Lafontaine, Francine - In: European economic review : EER 40 (1996) 3, pp. 923-932
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001205196
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Multitask agency problems : focus and task clustering
Dewatripont, Mathias; Jewitt, Ian; Tirole, Jean - In: European economic review : EER 44 (2000) 4/6, pp. 869-877
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001486975
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Cooperation and competition in organizations : a dynamic perspective
Meyer, Margaret A. - In: European economic review : EER 39 (1995) 3, pp. 709-722
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001181523
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Environmental risks and bank liability
Boyer, Marcel - In: European economic review : EER 41 (1997) 8, pp. 1427-1459
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230396
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Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk : Evidence from Procurement
Lewis, Gregory - 2011
Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117563