This paper studies a discrete-time utility maximization problem of an infinitely-lived quasi-geometric consumer whose labor income is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We restrict attention to a first-order Markov recursive solution. We show that under the assumption of...

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...

This paper extends the indivisible-labor model by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) to include multiple consumers who differ in initial wealth and whose labor productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, the optimal allocations for the...

This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...

This paper studies how the assumption of quasi-geometric (quasi-hyperbolic) discounting affects the individual consumption-savings behavior in the context of the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. The agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and face...

The paper proposes a theory of the wage arrears phenomenon in transition economies. We build on the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model. The neoclassical firms in transition make losses and use wage arrears as the survival strategy. At the agents' level, the randomness in the timing...

In this paper we study a situation were the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume 1) agents have complete information and play simultaneously; and 2) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an...

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sensethat their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply thisidea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. Wecharacterize the results that are generated by such a behavior in the cases...