This paper studies a discrete-time utility maximization problem of an infinitely-lived quasi-geometric consumer whose labor income is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We restrict attention to a first-order Markov recursive solution. We show that under the assumption of...

We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act...

We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...

This paper extends the indivisible-labor model by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) to include multiple consumers who differ in initial wealth and whose labor productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, the optimal allocations for the...

This paper studies how the assumption of quasi-geometric (quasi-hyperbolic) discounting affects the individual consumption-savings behavior in the context of the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. The agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and face...

The paper proposes a theory of the wage arrears phenomenon in transition economies. We build on the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model. The neoclassical firms in transition make losses and use wage arrears as the survival strategy. At the agents' level, the randomness in the timing...

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are...