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-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …
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To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...
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This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games.We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus...
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The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of...
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