Showing 1 - 10 of 1,049
. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among … the sellers when m < n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core conjecture in the lab with n + m = 3 or 5 randomly … agreements while trading. Despite frequent attempts to collude and occasional large deviations from the core prediction, we find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288168
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380988
models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420285
This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500229
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of … core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games …, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284063
The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf (1963) connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in … exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is … replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy shrinks to the set of competitive allocations. Florenzano (1989 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284192
Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058639
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131