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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556

Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers

Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257257

Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values

Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255779

Characterizations of Network Power Measures

Brink, René van den; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2008, 64, 519-536. A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256099

Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values

Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144455

Auctioning and Selling Positions : A Non-Cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts

van den Brink, René; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - 2014

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037678

Characterizations of Network Power Measures

Brink, René van den; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136939

A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games

Ju, Yuan; Borm, Peter - Centre for Economic Research, School of Economics and … - 2006

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416694

Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach

Ju, Yuan; Wettstein, David - Centre for Economic Research, School of Economics and … - 2006

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games.We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416702

Externalities and Compensation:Primeval Games and Solutions

Ju, Yuan; Borm, Peter - Centre for Economic Research, School of Economics and … - 2005

The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636092