We develop methods to solve general equilibrium models in which forward-looking agents are subject to waves of pessimism, optimism, and uncertainty that turn out to critically affect macroeconomic outcomes. Agents in the model are fully rational, conduct Bayesian learning, and they know that...

We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent's information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect....

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under...

When an economic agent makes a choice, stochastic models predicting those choices can be updated. The structural assumptions embedded in the prior model condition the updated one, to the extent that the same evidence produces different predictions even when previous ones were identical. We...

Based on the axiomatic framework of Choquet decision theory, we develop a closed-form model of Bayesian learning with ambiguous beliefs about the mean of a normal distribution. In contrast to rational models of Bayesian learning the resulting Choquet Bayesian estimator results in a long-run bias...