This paper extends the Cournot and Bertrand models of strategic interaction between firms by assuming that managers are … paper finds that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à la Cournot, then they may be able to sustain “collusive … reciprocity equilibrium. If there is Cournot competition between firms and their managers are averse to advantageous …

behavior in the two competitive settings and lead all firms in oligopoly to gain higher profits in Cournot than in Bertrand … and Mitra (2010). In duopoly, aggregate profits are equivalent in Cournot and Bertrand. …

infinity. In the limit, a range of outcomes stretching from Cournot via Stackelberg to Bertrand can result in equilibrium, i …-stage game, the set of outcomes is a quasi-hyperrectangle including Cournot, Allaz-Vila, and all two-stage Stackelberg outcomes …. In general, it consists of T-1 such hyperrectangles where the lower bound approaches the Bertrand outcome as T tends to …

governments under subsidy regime, Cournot competition is more efficient than Bertrand competition when the goods are substitutes … is greater under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. … or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition …

governments under subsidy regime, Cournot competition is more efficient than Bertrand competition when the goods are substitutes … about a change in the competition mode from Bertrand competition to Cournot competition if goods are substitutes. On the … or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition …