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The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; Silva, Hannelore; Bednarik, Peter; … - In: Experimental Economics 17 (2014) 2, pp. 285-303
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988977
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Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?
Casari, Marco; Luini, Luigi - In: Experimental Economics 15 (2012) 2, pp. 241-259
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866244
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Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance
Bwalya, Samuel - In: Experimental Economics 10 (2007) 2, pp. 181-182
laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model … CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was … cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711639
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On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments
Casari, Marco - In: Experimental Economics 8 (2005) 2, pp. 107-115
cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711648
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The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation
Dickinson, David - In: Experimental Economics 4 (2001) 1, pp. 107-124
This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of increasing effort among members of work teams. We study teams of four members in a laboratory environment in which giving effort towards the team goal is simulated by eliciting voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711733
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Dissertation abstract: Contribution to a public good - Theoretical analysis and experimental evidence
Hichri, Walid - In: Experimental Economics 10 (2007) 2, pp. 185-186
. This model predicts well the observed behaviour. The third part is composed of two experiments where the environment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068104
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An Experimental Investigation of Excludable Public Goods
Swope, Kurtis - In: Experimental Economics 5 (2002) 3, pp. 209-222
This paper extends the research on incentive compatible institutions for the provision of public goods by imposing a minimum contribution that must be met in order for an individual to enjoy the benefits of the public good. Excluding individuals who do not contribute at least the minimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678697
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Coordination and learning in dynamic global games: experimental evidence
Shurchkov, Olga - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 3, pp. 313-334
Coordination problems are ubiquitous in social and economic life. Political mass demonstrations, the decision whether to join a speculative currency attack, investment in a risky venture, and capital flight from a particular country are all characterized by coordination problems. Furthermore,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866261
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Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2021) 2, pp. 434-488
The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012627987
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Obviousness around the clock
Breitmoser, Yves; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian - In: Experimental Economics 25 (2021) 2, pp. 483-513
Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501391