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We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts “gains from trade” inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989000
, each voter supports (i.e., prefers) one of two exogenous candidates and privately decides between voting at a cost and … that policy offers include 33% more voters—yielding a smaller budget share for each—when voting is compulsory rather … experiments many subjects strongly react to economic incentives (i.e., benefits, costs, and informational clues), often in line …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711706
The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012627987
Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501391
This paper studies the effect of social relations on convergence to the efficient equilibrium in 2×2 coordination games from an experimental perspective. We employ a 2×2 factorial design in which we explore two different games with asymmetric payoffs and two matching protocols: “friends”...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988965
The ability to strategically reason is important in many competitive environments. In this paper, we examine how relatively mild temporal variations in cognition affect reasoning in the Beauty Contest. The source of temporal cognition variation that we explore is the time-of-day that decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988967
We conduct modified dictator games in which price of giving varies across choice situations, and examine responses to price changes in two contexts—one where dictators divide their own earnings, and another where they divide the earnings of others. Varying the price of giving allows us to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988973
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988977
We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. The main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256671