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Veto power in committees: an experimental study

Kagel, John; Sung, Hankyoung; Winter, Eyal - In: Experimental Economics 13 (2010) 2, pp. 167-188

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596847

Dissertation abstract: Essays on veto bargaining games

Sung, Hankyoung - In: Experimental Economics 10 (2007) 2, pp. 195-196

two cases: urgent committees where the total amount of money to be distributed shrinks by 50% if proposals do not pass and … non-urgent committees where the total amount of money shrinks by 5% if proposals do not pass. Committees with a veto …€™ proposer rights (e.g., limiting their ability to chair committees) would go a long way to curbing their power, a major concern …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711690

The impact of stress on tournament entry

Buser, Thomas; Dreber, Anna; Mollerstrom, Johanna - In: Experimental Economics 20 (2017) 2, pp. 506-530

, many people experience competitive contexts as stressful. We use two laboratory experiments to investigate whether factors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030251

Reactions to (the absence of) control and workplace arrangements: experimental evidence from the internet and the laboratory

Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - In: Experimental Economics 23 (2020) 4, pp. 933-960

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the influence of workplace arrangements on the reactions to (the absence of) control. We compare behavior in an Internet and a laboratory principal-agent game where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503936

Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea - In: Experimental Economics 24 (2021) 2, pp. 434-488

The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012627987

Obviousness around the clock

Breitmoser, Yves; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian - In: Experimental Economics 25 (2021) 2, pp. 483-513

Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501391

The dark side of friendship: ‘envy’

Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia - In: Experimental Economics 15 (2012) 4, pp. 547-570

This paper studies the effect of social relations on convergence to the efficient equilibrium in 2×2 coordination games from an experimental perspective. We employ a 2×2 factorial design in which we explore two different games with asymmetric payoffs and two matching protocols: “friends”...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988965

Circadian effects on strategic reasoning

Dickinson, David; McElroy, Todd - In: Experimental Economics 15 (2012) 3, pp. 444-459

The ability to strategically reason is important in many competitive environments. In this paper, we examine how relatively mild temporal variations in cognition affect reasoning in the Beauty Contest. The source of temporal cognition variation that we explore is the time-of-day that decisions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988967

Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to measure distributional preferences

Jakiela, Pamela - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 2, pp. 208-221

We conduct modified dictator games in which price of giving varies across choice situations, and examine responses to price changes in two contexts—one where dictators divide their own earnings, and another where they divide the earnings of others. Varying the price of giving allows us to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988973

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; Silva, Hannelore; Bednarik, Peter; … - In: Experimental Economics 17 (2014) 2, pp. 285-303

A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988977