This paper reports an experiment to determine whether subjects will learn to stop using a strictly dominated strategy that can be an above average reply. It is difficult to find an experimental design that eliminates the play of the strictly dominated strategy completely. The least effective...

Almost every week national elections are held somewhere in the world. Many more elections take place at federal and local levels of government. Surely, these are important events to many of us. This thesis aims at providing a better understanding of why and how people vote in elections. Three...

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.†Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past...

This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume other players do so as well. We define an agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE), which applies QRE...

In certain markets success may depend on how well participants anticipate the behavior of other participants who have varying amounts of experience. Understanding if and how people’s behavior depends on competitors’ level of experience is important since in most markets...

Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We...

The “collective action problem†describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse off. I present a new solution to...

This paper examines the Dirty Faces problem as a Bayesian game. The equilibrium in the general form of the game requires the extreme assumption of common knowledge of rationality. However, for any finite number of players, the exact number of steps of iterated rationality necessary for the...