We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total...

Summary Poverty indices are usually calculated on the basis of (cross section) income data from the past. As past income is fixed and future income is uncertain such measurement does not reflect the ex ante risk of falling into poverty. This paper presents refinements of commonly used poverty...

We analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of...

This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal...

We study the potential of tropical multi-age multi-species forests for sequestering carbon in response to financial incentives from REDD+. The use of reduced impact logging techniques (RIL) allows a forest owner to apply for carbon credits whereas the use of conventional logging techniques (CL)...

In this paper we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. Specifically, by means of this ensemble of models we are able to identify...