This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on...

This paper explores transnational environmental agreements on climate change. As the Paris agreement of 2015 contains no binding emission reduction targets for nation states, understanding other forms of cooperation as complements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change...

We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total...

In spite of scientific agreement on the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change, efforts to find cooperative solutions on the international level have been unsatisfactory so far. Trade sanctions in the form of import tariffs are one principal measure discussed as a means to foster...

We study the potential of tropical multi-age multi-species forests for sequestering carbon in response to financial incentives from REDD+. The use of reduced impact logging techniques (RIL) allows a forest owner to apply for carbon credits whereas the use of conventional logging techniques (CL)...

Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and...

We analyze river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...

We analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of...

This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal...

In this paper we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. Specifically, by means of this ensemble of models we are able to identify...