Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they 'fall back' on … their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If … there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition …

) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation …

2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including … virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain … from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller …

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition … structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …

information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …