International carbon offsets have been promoted since the Kyoto Protocol and an increasing number of countries have implemented or proposed cap-and-trade schemes with international trading, even though with quantitative or qualitative restrictions. Those limits reflect the trade-off between...

Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...

The climate-trade nexus gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts to forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. This raises the issues of the scope of trade-related measures and of when and how they could be used. This paper discusses how far...

This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two di- mensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current...

The paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the...

This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement for which countries...

This paper examines the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an economy with trade. We extent the basic model of the IEAs by letting countries choose emission taxes and import tariffs as their policy instruments in order to manage climate change and control trade. We...

We offer a framework to assign quantitative allocations of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), across countries, one budget period at a time. Under the two-part plan: China, India, and other developing countries accept targets at Business as Usual (BAU) in the coming budget period, the same...

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...

We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements on emission reductions....