We examine an implication of the “Coase Theorem” which has had an important impact both on environmental economics and on public policy in the environmental domain. Under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the...

Tourism and environmental preservation are often conflicting activities, mainly in areas such as coastal lagoons, where seaside mass-tourism comes into contact with a very sensitive ecological system. In this paper we deal with a classical problem of both environmental and tourism economics, the...

The external influence of scholarly activity has to date been measured primarily in terms of publications and citations, metrics that also dominate the promotion and grant processes. Yet the array of scholarly activities visible to the outside world are far more extensive and recently developed...

This paper is the first to assess operational and probabilistic externalities of oil extraction and transportation to Europe on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of realistic future oil demand-supply scenarios, of the relative relevance of import routes, of the local specificities in terms...

The evolution of renewable resources is characterized in many cases by different time scales where some state variables such as biomass, may evolve relatively faster than other state variables such as carrying capacity. Ignoring this time scale separation means that a slowly changing variable is...

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the...

Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...

This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a first mover advantage. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response...

We evaluate the effectiveness of non optimal and temporally inconsistent incentive policies for regulating the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. The corresponding game is an N-person discrete-time deterministic dynamic game of T periods fixed duration. Three policy instruments...

This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories...