We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …

either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or … split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in …

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict … core of the game is nonempty …

structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable …