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Equilibrium and Matching Under Price Controls

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2015

The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and allows for intermediate cases with some restrictions on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021278

Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games

Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao-Chin - 2011

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179795

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Mauleon, Ana; Vergote, Wouter - 2008

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219020

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games

Zhao, Jingang - 2008

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or … split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219135

The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary; Young, H. Peyton - 2013

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157261

The Long Italian Stagnation and the Welfare Effects of Outsourcing

Zotti, Jacopo - 2016

The stagnation of the Italian economy over the last two decades is widely documented. During this period, the world economy has become highly integrated, and foreign outsourcing has become a standard practice for firms. While trade theory predicts benefits from the internationalization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001009

How (Not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

Gall, Thomas; Amann, Roland - 2006

This paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject to peer effects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous utility. When agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions, ability and social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model predicts segregation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058086

The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers : A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Analysis

Montero, Maria - 2010

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136169

Dynamic Multilateral Markets

Polanski, Arnold - 2012

We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114554

Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

Koczy, Laszlo A. - 2009

structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative …, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153794