The efficient supply of spare parts is of prime concern for OEMs. Next to the traditional spare parts sources in form of final order and remanufacturing, the option to buy back broken products prevents the OEM from fulfilling his spare parts availability obligation in the end-of-life phase and...

Based on a serial supply chain model with 2-periods and price-sensitive demand, we present the first experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance. In theory, if holding costs are low enough, the buyer builds up a strategic inventory (even if no operational...

Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a cooperative mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the cooperative mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but...

The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One major assumption in this context is that subjects will rather use their private information strategically than to reveal them truthfully, if they do not get any...

Screening contracts are a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. Previous research in this area shows that asymmetric information leads to supply chain coordination deficits. We extend the standard framework of lotsizing decisions under...

We consider a principal agent problem in a decentralized organization. The agent holds private information with respect to an uncertain demand within a single selling season. As such his task is to determine the optimal order quantity. Being head of a profit center, however, he naturally focuses...

The strategic use of private information causes efficiency losses in traditional principal-agent settings. One stream of research states that these efficiency losses cannot be overcome if all agents use their private information strategically. Yet, another stream of research highlights the...

Screening contracts (or non-linear "menu of contracts") are frequently used for aligning the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply chain parties are strictly (expected) profit maximizing and, therefore, sensible to even arbitrarily...

This contribution focuses on the cost-effective management of the combined use of two procurement options: the short-term option is given by a spot market with random price, whereas the long-term alternative is characterized by a multi period capacity reservation contract with fixed purchase...

After-sales service is a major profit generator for more and more OEMs in industries with durable products. Successful engagement in after-sales service improves customer loyalty and allows for competitive differentiation through superior service like an extended service period after end of...