Private state-verification is introduced in a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods and complete futures markets for contingent delivery in the second period. Existence of equilibrium is established, under standard assumptions. The equilibrium allocation is shown to be generically...

An economy with ex ante markets for future delivery contingent on ex post spot market prices is considered. Since spot prices are publicly observed ex post, this framework bypasses the enforcement problems that may arise as a result of differential information about states of nature....

We study a 3-region version of the Footloose Entrepreneur model by Forslid and Ottaviano (J Econ Geogr, 2003). We focus on the analysis of stability of three types of long-run equilibria: agglomeration, dispersion and partial dispersion. We find that the 3-region model exhibits more tendency for...

We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in the case in which the bureaucratic bias is firm's private information. We find that output is distorted upward when the bureaucratic bias is low, downward when it is high, and equals a reference output when it is...

We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied - cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the...