We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full...

We examine the impact of agreements that prohibit "superstars" from switching their services to rivals on firms' ability to collude. Exclusivity (or non-compete) clauses are not uncommon in the sports,entertainment and professional services industries, but courts often refrain from enforcing...

We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of ?rms?reputations when ?rms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single ?rm, in the case of joint projects a ?rm?s reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not...

I analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the con- tracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and e¢ ciency of investment can con?ict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals...