In this paper we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze the impact of institu- tional herding on asset prices. A growing empirical literature has come to the intriguing conclusion that institutional herding positively predicts short-term returns but nega- tively predicts long-term...

Recent studies show that single-quarter institutional herding positively predicts short-term returns. Motivated by the theoretical herding literature, which emphasizes endogenous persistence in decisions over time, we estimate the effect of multi-quarter institutional buying and selling on stock...

What are the equilibrium features of a market where a sizeable portion of traders face career concerns? This question is central to our understanding of Þnancial markets that are increasingly dominated by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio management that...

This paper ?nds that fund herding, de?ned as the tendency of a mutual fund to follow past aggregate institutional trades, is an important predictor of mutual fund performance. Examining actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 1990-2009, we ?nd that funds with a higher herding...

This paper shows that the systematic risk (or 'beta') of individual stocks increases by an economically and statistically significant amount on days of firm-specific news announcements, and reverts to its average level two to five days later. We employ intra-daily data and recent advances in...

We investigate how business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds’ proxy voting using a comprehensive dataset spanning 2003 to 2011. In sharp contrast to the prior literature, we show that the proxy voting of mutual funds is significantly influenced by their business ties with...

We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who com- pete for investor ?ow. In our model, activists are intrinsically able to raise the value of target ?rms through monitoring. Competition for investor ?ow induces them to enhance the returns generated by monitoring...

Publicly traded corporations are a¤ected by a core agency problem: managers pay the full cost of e¤ort in running the corporations but shareholders enjoy most of the bene?ts. When ownership is dispersed individual shareholders have little incentive to monitor managers and little ability to...

Mutual funds hold large blocks of shares in many major corporations. Practitioners and regulators alike have been concerned that mutual funds use their proxy votes in a promanagement manner in order to garner lucrative pensions administration contracts, thus hindering shareholder value. Such...

We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with individual learning about payoffs affects the ability of agents to coordinate efficiently in global coordination games. Two players face the option to invest irreversibly in a project in one of many rounds. The...