Governments typically respond to a run on the banking system by temporarily freezing deposits and by rescheduling payments to depositors. Depositors may even be required to demonstrate an urgent need for funds before being allowed to withdraw. We study ex post efficient policy responses to a...

We study optimal government policy in an economy where (i) search frictions create a coordination problem and generate multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and (ii) the government finances the provision of a public good by taxing trade. The government must choose the tax rate before it knows which...

This paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria. Such models are often criticized as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each possible...

We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the deposit contract offered and the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross (1998) have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show...

We study a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation in which the bank and all depositors observe withdrawals as they occur. We derive the constrained efficient allocation of resources in closed form and show that this allocation provides liquidity...