We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives are highest when business conditions are good, but not...

In this article, we provide an interpretation for the voluntary independence requirements contained in the Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code) checking them against a proxy for international best practice, the independence criteria provided in the EC Recommendation on non-executive...

This essay is a contribution to the empirical literature on the effect of inflation tax on capital structure. A simple empirical model considering the main results of the current theoretical development is studied, using microdata from a number of American corporations.

Economists tend to agree that the recent cutting of dividends taxes will encourage investment and reduce financial distress. In addition to creating these “benefits,” however, the tax cut can also increase governance costs. For example, by removing a bias for leveraged capital structures,...

This study analyzes the interaction of agency problems in public policy and of agency problems inside the firm: it investigates the case of a large privatized firm subject to many policy constraints. The last steps of Telefonica's privatization were designed to promote a disperse ownership and...

This paper analyses the evolution of Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms and organizational changes of the Hellenic Telecommunication Organization (HTO) and has two objectives: to enrich the debate and to contribute to the increasing body of literature by examining and analyzing the...

Comment offrir à aux entreprises, en particulier les petites, une évaluation individualisée de leur qualité, leur permettant, d’une part, de mieux gérer leurs projets et leur développement et, d’autre part, de signaler leur qualité aux tiers, dont les banques. Le problème...

This article studies how equity ownership and corporate control were separated in the United States. Initially, railroads and industrial firms were tightly controlled by a few shareholders; this situation was altered in the 1890s by massive mergers and reorganizations, which allowed private...

Many interest rates are as volatile as exchange rates and thus represent an equally important source of risk for corporations. While this is true not only for financial institutions, but for other corporations as well, little is known about the interest rate exposure of nonfinancial firms....

Dans un article d’octobre 2001, Jensen souligne les limites opérationnelles de la théorie de la maximisation de la valeur et de la théorie des parties prenantes (Stakeholder theory). La complémentarité entre ces théories vient de l’affirmation que le bien être collectif n’est...