We explore the actions of financially distressed banks in two distinct periods that include financial crises (1985 … widespread belief that distressed banks gamble for resurrection, we document that distressed banks take actions to reduce … forces beyond formal regulations incentivize bank managers to deleverage when their banks are in distress …

The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage … include financial crises and are subject to different regulatory regimes (1985–1994, 2005–2014). We find that distressed banks …

risky banks, thereby creating market discipline. An alternative perspective is that market discipline is limited (e.g., due … to deposit insurance and/or enhanced capital regulation) and that internal demand for funding by banks determines rates … capitalization levels. In contrast, banks' loan growth has a causal effect on deposit rates: e.g., branches' deposit rates are …