We employ an empirical general equilibrium model of the CAP to determine which factors and countries would be expected to be opposed to or support reform of the CAP. The objective is to determine who the "friends" and "enemies" of the CAP are. The analysis studies the extent to which lobbying...

The political science literature has long been concerned with the behavioral properties of alternative bargaining institutions. The focus of most of this research has been on the way in which committees make decisions, but there has been some interest in legislative and electoral processes. From...

This paper describes a laboratory experiment design that has been developed to assess a new political economy institution for possible use in trade negotiations. The objective of this paper is to explain the implementation of this experimental design in the context of a "horizontal" model of a...

In a companion series of papers, we have described a new bargaining institution and the design of laboratory experiments to assess its performance (see Rausser and Simon [1991] and Harrison and Simon [1991]). In this paper we describe and evaluate the first series of pilot experiments. In...

This study surveys and evaluates the experimental economics literature on bargaining. The basic results derived in this literature are assessed in terms of their relevance for the GATT negotiations underway, as well as the imposition of any GATT code that might be approved by the U.S....

Is it possible to design a bargaining institution that will substantially improve the international trade negotiations conducted in a multilateral basis? Rausser and Simon [1991] propose a multilateral bargaining (MB) institution which has many attractive theoretical properties, and which...

This paper describes the basic laboratory experiment design that has been developed to assess a new Multilateral Bargaining institution that may be used for trade negotiations. Our overall objective is to implement a series of laboratory experiments that tests the ability of this institutions to...

We employ a numerical equilibrium model to evaluate the payoffs to agricultural and non-agricultural interests in the EC and the US. A government objective function for each region is calibrated as a weighted sum of the payoffs to the two interest groups with weights corresponding to the...