This paper shows that, in a partially welfarist framework that permits discounting, per-period social evaluations can be consistent with a timeless social ordering only if social principles lead to the repugnant conclusion. The same result applies if per-period social evaluations are replaced by...

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for input (or output) aggregation of efficiency indices. As such it parallels earlier arguments in the capital aggregation literature. The resulting quantity-dependent indices provide a rationalisation of the Debreu/Farrell efficiency...

This paper provides a survey of normative approaches to inequality measurement, to be published as a chapter in a volume of income inequality. We present general methods for deriving ethical inequality indexes from social-evaluation orderings such as the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen and Kolm procedures.

This paper analyzes variable-population social-evaluation principles in a framework where outcomes are uncertain. In a static model, we provide characterizations of expected-utility versions of Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarian rules.

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potential allows for a characterisation of such an equilibrium.

This paper constructs an overlapping generations model of pollution externality wherein individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. each agent concerned by the environmental degradation can volutary contribute in order to reduce it. Contributing to the environmental quality means financing depollution activities...

This paper studies within a dynamical model how decentralized individuals happen to elect non-proprietary standard. The issue is coordination because the individual benefit of adoption depends on whether other agents elect to adopt the same standard. It shows that whenthere are increasing...