In games with multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria and repeated play, does a history of playing an inefficient equilibrium make it harder for the players to reach the efficient equilibrium? In other words, can people 'get stuck' in bad equilibria? Previous studies have found support for this,...

Coordination games have become a critical tool of analysis in fields such as development and institutional economics. Understanding behavior in coordination games is an important step towards understanding the differing success of teams, firms and nations. This paper investigates the...

Expositions of the theory of public finance mostly assume that taxation must be the primary instrument for generating revenue. This assumption is neither historically accurate nor theoretically necessary. Rather, it universalizes an institutional arrangement that is particular to the...

This paper treats the structure of economic theory as a product of spontaneously ordered relationships among theorists in a setting where different institutional frameworks can govern those relationships. Those differences generate different selection principles among economic theories and,...

In randomized control laboratory experiments, we find that those primed to think about markets exhibit more trusting behavior. We randomly and unconsciously prime experimental participants to think about markets and trade. We then ask them to play a trust game involving an anonymous stranger. We...

Economic theory contains a significant theoretical antinomy. Markets are thought to secure coordination in self-organized fashion. In contrast, polities are portrayed as securing coordination through planning and administration. Doing this is to commit what Mitchel Resnick (1994) calls the...

Economic theory contains a significant theoretical antinomy that we seek to erase. That theory can account for coordination through markets. Such coordination, however, covers only some 50-60 percent of economic activity within developed nations. The theory ignores the remainder by presuming...

When directives rather than contracts determine rights to water flows, agents will substitute away from securing water rights by contract toward securing them through political directives. Especially when they are legitimated by court rulings, such directives alter the rules that govern social...

Expositions of the theory of public finance mostly presume that taxation will be the primary instrument for generating revenues. While this presumption is historically accurate, it does not so much reflect historical necessity as it reflects a combination of power and ideology. Cities are...

While going to trial is always an option for settling a legal dispute, settlement prior to trial is the more common response. Settlement allows the parties to avoid the expenses entailed in going to trial, leaving both parties potentially better off than had they gone to trial. Such legal...