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ACCURACY OF LINEAR VALUATION RULES IN INDUSTRY SEGMENTED ENVIRONMENTS: INDUSTRY VS. ECONOMY-WEIGHTED INDEXES.

LIM, S.S.; SUNDER, S. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102284

Insider Information and its Role in Security Markets.

Sunder, S. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005070174

Sealed Bid Auctions and Economic Market Game.

Thompson, G.L. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073563

Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs.

Glazer, A.; Mumy, G.E.; Niskanen, E. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073587

ECONOMETRIC EFFICIENCY OF ASSET VALUATION RULES UNDER PRICE MOVEMENT AND MEASUREMENT ERRORS.

LIM, S.S.; SUNDER, S. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073594

IMPLICIT COSTS AND PRICES FOR RESOURCES WITH BUSY PERIODS

MORTON, T.E.; SINGH, M. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102261

FUTURE MANIPULATION WITH "CASH SETTLEMENT".

KUMAR, P.; SEPPI, D.J. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027595

SCHED-STAR A PRICE-BASED SHOP SCHEDULING MODULE

MORTON, T.E.; LAWRENCE, S.R.; RAJAGOPOLAN, S.; KEKRE, S. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029098

Information Technology Innovation and Competition in the Presence of Switching Costs.

Davamanirajan, P.; Kriebel, C.H.; Mukhopadhyay, T. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029162

Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection.

Arya, A.; Glover, J.; Rajan, U. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1999

This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementaion models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968788