We study how the presence of non-exclusive contracts limits the amount of insurance provided in a decentralized economy. We consider a dynamic Mirrleesian economy in which agents are privately informed about idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. Agents sign privately observable insurance...

We study the quantitative properties of constrained e¢ cient allocations in an environ- ment where risk sharing is limited by the presence of private information. We consider a life cycle version of a standard Mirrlees economy where shocks to labor productiv- ity have a component that is public...

A model of racial discrimination provides testable implications for two features of statistical discriminators: differential treatment of signals by race and heterogeneous experience that shapes perception. We construct an experiment in the U.S. rental apartment market that distinguishes...

This paper provides a new estimation and solution method for a generalized class of sorting hedonic models based on discrete approximations of the distribution of housing quality. Our approach incorporates heterogeneity in preferences and treats quality as latent. Additionally, a housing market...

To detect the presence of predatory pricing, antitrust authorities routinely ask whether a firm sacrifices current profit in exchange for the expectation of higher future profit following the exit of its rival. Because predatory pricing is an inherently dynamic phenomenon, we show in this paper...