I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions...

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges...

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...

Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there are no conflicting interests and subjects are organised in fixed pairs. This is so, even though a simple adjustment process would lead the subjects into the efficient, fair and...

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication network, where some nodes are controlled by an adversary. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist ε-secret and ε-strongly secure communication protocols (∀ε0): if all nodes are obedient the...

This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford–Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium...

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...