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Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case

Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - EconWPA - 2005

also study the asymptotic stability properties of rest points. While strict Nash equilibria may be unstable, we identify … sufficient conditions for local and global asymptotic stability which use concepts developed in evolutionary game theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062331

Through Trial & Error to Collusion

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1998

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062333

The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)

Dulleck, Uwe; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1996

In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062381

Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - EconWPA - 1998

are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for stability of rest points. Finally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407530

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609

On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - EconWPA - 2000

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS …) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the …. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550865