This paper studies an adaptive artificial agent model using a genetic algorithm to analyze how a population of decision-makers learns to coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized entry-level...

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Suppose Player A is playing two apparently independent repeated games with two other people, B and C, with A randomly matched, each period, with either B or C. Each dyad maintains the maximum incentive-compatible level of cooperation within the dyad, even if cooperation has broken down in the...

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount...

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover,...

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...

In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss",...

We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which...

We introduce a new value for NTU games with coalition structure. This value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and with the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. Furthermore, we present two characterizations: the first one using a consistency...

The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model...