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Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543

Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

information. This way we are able to investigate (i) the coordination abilities of the subjects depending on the underlying game …, (ii) the resulting efficiency loss, and (iii) the adjustment of the learning rule. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575

Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games

Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997

-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This … asymmetric continuation paths. The multiplicity of possible conventions gives rise to a coordination problem at a higher level if … the game is one of pure coordination. However, if there is a slight conflict of interest between players, a unique optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601

Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games

Montero, Maria - EconWPA - 2005

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124853

Bargaining with commitments

Vidal-Puga, Juan - EconWPA - 2003

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124854

Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

Huberman, Bernardo A.; Laboratories, Tad Hogg HP - EconWPA - 2003

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with present technologies. It provides …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062323

Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case

Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - EconWPA - 2005

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous— time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062331

Learning, Matching and Aggregation

Hopkins, Ed - EconWPA - 1995

Fictitious play and ``gradient'' learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062332

Through Trial & Error to Collusion

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1998

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062333

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - EconWPA - 2005

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062336

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