Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 132
Cover Image
Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers
Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609
Cover Image
An Experiment on the Value of Structural Information in a 2x2 Repeated Game
Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2002
In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889
Cover Image
Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates
Berliant, Marcus; Konishi, Hideo - EconWPA - 2004
simultaneously, announcing any positions they choose on any issues. To us, salience is simply the discussion of an issue in a … campaign. If both candidates and voters are expected utility maximizers, we find salience results, in that candidates typically …-Schmeidler to illustrate how robust nonsalience and salience of issues might be generated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118536
Cover Image
Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices
Riechmann, Thomas - EconWPA - 2005
This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of inter-group competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062347
Cover Image
Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Riechmann, Thomas; Weimann, Joachim - EconWPA - 2004
rather classical economic institution: competition. In a series of laboratory experiments, we reveal that the true reason for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062352
Cover Image
Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control
Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001
game of mutual fate control, while earlier psychologists' experiments show some tendency to convergence. Our rivalling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543
Cover Image
Learning, Matching and Aggregation
Hopkins, Ed - EconWPA - 1995
Fictitious play and ``gradient'' learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062332
Cover Image
A general model of best response adaptation
Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2003
We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large populations for symmetric and asymmetric conflicts with role-switching. For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062353
Cover Image
A Learning Approach to Auctions
Hon-Snir, Shlomit; Monderer, Dov; Sela, Aner - EconWPA - 1996
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062361
Cover Image
Some Notes on Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2004
Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407536